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INTRODUCTION 
The term “terrorism” is widely used by the current media. Every day, television broadcasts, 
newspaper and other information channels all around the world inform about violence, civilian 
casualties and destruction caused by terrorists. Our society, however, has encountered many 
forms of this phenomenon practically in all periods of history. Consider, for instance, the Sicarii 
(first century), the Al-Hashshashin (eleventh century), or Narodnaya Volya 
(nineteenth century).1 In all these examples terrorism represented an instrument for achieving 
various political goals. The concept of terrorism has persisted and still poses a considerable 
threat not only to the safety and security of individuals, but also to the fundamental elements 
of states.  
Alongside the development of methods of terrorism, society has developed ways of fighting it. 
This dissertation addresses modern forms of countering terrorism in the sense of sanctions 
regime(s) established by the United Nations Security Council. It is therefore primarily intended 
for people who already have some knowledge in this area and wish to explore this field further.  
This work is divided into three main sections. While relying largely, but not exclusively, on 
the Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States2 and Steve 
Coll’s Ghost wars,3 the first section describes the circumstances under which the Taliban and 
al Qaeda formed and evolved. It also focuses on the motivations of the United Nations Security 
Council to impose targeted sanctions under Resolution 1267 (1999). Grasping the historical 
background is necessary for understanding the next section, which examines the core of the 
sanctions regime, particularly its general idea, structure and processes that allow it to achieve 
its designated goals. Based on research findings and a wide range of relevant materials, 
the concluding section assesses the effectiveness of the sanctions regime as well as providing 
a view towards future challenges and prospects. 
  
                                                          
1 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 17. 
2 “9/11 Commission Report,” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, accessed 
March 6, 2011, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. 
3 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion 
to September 10, 2001 (London: Penguin Books, 2005). 
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1. HISTORICAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In our times, the international community is struggling particularly with two groups called the 
Taliban and al Qaeda. Cooperating extensively, these two groups have managed to take 
advantage of the political and social turmoil in several countries and create a worldwide 
network for promoting their demagogic ideology. In this effort they have used and still use 
deadly methods, which is the reason why they are considered so exceptionally dangerous.  
Although these two groups work closely together, it is necessary to make a distinction between 
them. While the Taliban is rather an insurgent movement and operates almost exclusively in 
Afghanistan, al Qaeda is a typical terrorist organization with global reach. As indicated earlier, 
the establishment of the Taliban and al Qaeda was driven by instability in Afghanistan during 
and after Soviet occupation. The country was practically in permanent chaos since 1979. 
The end of one war meant only the beginning of another. Those who were once seen as heroes 
fighting the Soviets had turned into merciless warlords taking whatever they wanted without 
repercussions. The absence of any rule of law encouraged the development of bribery, a black 
market with weapons, and drug production. The civil war put Afghanistan into one of the most 
serious humanitarian crises the world has ever witnessed. Hope for change came with a group 
of people that formed around Mohammed Omar. They called themselves the “Taliban,” which 
literally means “the students of religion.”4 Afghans welcomed the Taliban at first because they 
stood up to the cruel warlords and wanted to establish peace once and for all. However, soon 
after they gained power, the Taliban revealed its dark side.  
Meanwhile, another group called al Qaeda appeared on the scene. It was established during the 
Afghan jihad by Osama bin Laden, who had at that time volunteered to oust the Soviets. 
Al Qaeda drew on the successes of Maktab al-Khidmat (or “Bureau of Services”), a recruiting 
network that channelled young Muslim volunteers from all over the world to Afghanistan. 
However, Bin Laden was aware more than others about the extent of the conflict. He knew that 
“the continuation and eventual success of the jihad in Afghanistan depended on an increasingly 
complex, almost worldwide organization.”5 For this reason he created al Qaeda, which can be 
translated as “the foundation,” or “the base.” As its name suggests, it was designed to serve as 
a central organization for potential global jihad.  
                                                          
4 “Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law: Taliban,” Christiane Philipp, para. 1, accessed 
July 17, 2012, http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e1479. 
5 Ibid. 2, at 55.  
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The two groups evolved separately for several years up until the mid-1990s. By 1996 the 
Taliban controlled most of the Afghan territory, including the capital, and were strictly 
enforcing Islamic law. Bin Laden by that time had located in Sudan and was spreading 
a network of his own but was forced to leave the country because the new political leadership 
under international pressure lost enthusiasm to assist him. He moved to Afghanistan where 
the Taliban regime provided him sanctuary. Osama bin Laden was welcomed in Afghanistan 
because of his access to large financial resources as well as sharing the same religious and 
political opinions with Mohammed Omar.  
Comparing the activities of both groups on a global scale, the Taliban played a rather passive, 
but very important role as al Qaeda’s ally. Before the Taliban ascended to power in 
Afghanistan, al Qaeda was slowly building a sophisticated network of cells worldwide which 
it still operates through even now. In the sense of what he called “cutting the head off a snake,”6 
Osama bin Laden planned and perpetrated a number of smaller regional attacks in early 1990s. 
In 1998, two years after the declaration of war against the United States and their allies,7 Bin 
Laden executed an attack on two US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Massive explosions 
claimed the lives of almost 300 people and left behind another 5000 injured.8 The United States, 
which did not view Osama bin Laden as a threat at first, had to reconsider his danger.  
The world’s attention turned to Afghanistan again. The country was at that time ruled de facto 
by the Taliban and was providing safe haven to Osama bin Laden and his associates. Regardless 
of the 1998 incident, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) called upon the Taliban 
regime on several occasions to “stop fighting, conclude a ceasefire and resume negotiations 
without delay,”9 to put end to the “violations of human rights, as well as violations of 
international humanitarian law,”10 to stop providing “sanctuary and training for international 
terrorists and their organizations,”11 and to “halt the cultivation, production and trafficking 
of illegal drugs.”12 The Taliban did not comply with any of these resolutions. Instead, 
the regime attempted to gain international recognition. As soon as it was discovered that Bin 
                                                          
6 “Overview of the Enemy,” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, accessed July 
30, 2012, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_statement_15.pdf. 
7 Osama bin Laden, “Declaration of War Against the United States,” August 23, 1996. 
8 “Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents,” RAND Corporation, accessed July 30, 2012 
http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search.php. 
9 UN Doc. S/RES/1214(1998), para. 1.  
10 UN Doc. S/RES/1214(1998), para. 12. 
11 UN Doc. S/RES/1214(1998), para. 13. 
12 UN Doc. S/RES/1214(1998), para. 14. 
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Laden was behind the bombings of the US embassies and was being harboured in Afghanistan, 
effective action was necessary. The UNSC therefore demanded the Taliban to surrender Osama 
bin Laden so he could be brought to justice. In Resolution 1267 (1999) the UNSC gave 
the Taliban regime a final chance to comply with its demands or else it would impose sanctions. 
As it is now known, the Taliban ignored the resolution and as of November 14, 1999, 
the sanctions regime came into force. 
2. SANCTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER 
2.1. Evolution of the practice of sanctions 
White and Abass define sanctions as “[p]unitive measures and deeper coercion than necessary 
to force the responsible State to stop its illegal act.”13 Naturally, they continue, “in a general 
sense all measures designed to enforce the law can be seen as sanctions.”14 Before proceeding 
to the examination of the sanctions regime(s) established pursuant to the Security Council 
Resolution 1267 (1999) (and 1373 (2001)), it is essential to understand the role of the United 
Nations, and in particular the UN Security Council, as a world problem solver.  
Of the current five principal organs of the United Nations, the Security Council is the most 
powerful. It was designed to take effective action whenever international peace and security 
was threatened or breached. While doing so, the UNSC has a variety of measures at its disposal, 
ranging from imposing sanctions to the use of force. Similarly to the General Assembly 
(UNGA), the Security Council is entitled to make recommendations and adopt resolutions. 
Unlike the UNGA, the UNSC resolutions adopted under Chapter VII are binding for all 
Member States. Furthermore, in relation to these provisions, it is important to mention 
Article 103, which puts the UN Charter (and therefore the decisions of the UNSC) above any 
international agreement that conflicts with the Member States’ obligations arising from the 
Charter. 
All these provisions combined constitute a very strong instrument of the international 
community to respond to any crisis in a quick and effective manner. However, the creators of 
the Charter did not count on the important fact that the UNSC would be a political body. Hence, 
for certain period, the variety of interests lowered the efficiency promised by Article 24. 
Although the provisions of the Charter were very clear, the UNSC could not fully exercise its 
                                                          
13 Malcolm D. Evans, International Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 548. 
14 Ibid. 
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functions until the end of the Cold War. The strong bipolar tensions between the United States 
and the Soviet Union were reflected in ambiguous UNSC decisions that subsequently 
undermined its legitimacy. Consider, for example, the dispute between Iran and the USSR in 
1946, when after these two countries had reached peaceful agreement and the UNSC insisted 
on keeping the case on the agenda, the USSR stated that it would not take part in any sessions 
where this specific question was discussed.15 In 1950, the USSR, this time dissatisfied with the 
failure to substitute Communist China with Nationalist China, abandoned the UNSC and made 
it clear that all the resolutions adopted during their absence would not be recognized.16 
These and many other events raised several issues about the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the UNSC. When the Cold War ended, the UNSC finally started delivering according to the 
promise of the UN Charter. Duijzentkunst pointedly comments that “the end of the diplomatic 
freeze between East and West enabled the organs of the UN to finally explore the full potential 
of their powers.”17   
A relevant example of this exploration represents the Lockerbie case. In 1988 an aerial incident 
in Scottish airspace over the small town of Lockerbie occurred. An explosion in the aircraft’s 
cargo compartment caused it to fall and subsequently crash into a residential area. It was not 
an accident, but an intentional terrorist attack resulting in 270 deaths. The United States, the 
United Kingdom and France requested Libya, inter alia, to extradite two of its nationals who 
were responsible for the attack.18 The Libyan government refused and the UNSC therefore 
adopted Resolution 731 (1992), urging Libya to respond to the request. Since Resolution 731 
was not adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the US, UK, and France could not rely 
on the binding effect of its decision. Two months later, Libya instituted proceedings against 
the United States19 and the United Kingdom20 before the International Court of Justice under 
Article 14 of the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Civil Aviation (or Montreal Convention) of 1971.21 Libya argued that it acted fully in 
accordance with the provisions of the Montreal Convention. Furthermore, the United States 
                                                          
15 Benedetto Conforti, The Law and Practice of the United Nations, 3rd ed. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2005), 68-69. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Bart S. Duijzentkunst, “Interpretation of legislative Security Council resolutions,” Utrecht Law Review 4 
(2008): 188. 
18 UN Doc. S/23308. 
19 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident 
at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Application instituting proceedings, 1992. 
20 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident 
at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Application instituting proceedings, 1992. 
21 David J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 6th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), 1082. 
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and the United Kingdom breached the Montreal Convention by requesting Libya surrender two 
of its nationals. In March 1992 at the request of the US, UK, and France, the UNSC “adopted 
Resolution 748 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, requiring Libya to return the alleged 
offenders and imposing sanctions against it for not doing so.”22 The UNSC determined that 
supporting terrorist activities constituted a threat to international peace and security and 
therefore invoked its special powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to adopt a binding 
resolution.23  
Returning to the original issue, an innovation is evident in Resolution 1267 (1999) in the field 
of sanctions. Libya was sanctioned for not extraditing two of its nationals accused of direct 
involvement in the Lockerbie incident and therefore deemed a state sponsor of terrorism. 
By this logic, the UNSC should have sanctioned Afghanistan, yet it sanctioned the Taliban 
group instead. Why? The newly established state of Afghanistan did not have the necessary 
recognition from the international community. Although the Taliban controlled the majority of 
Afghan territory, it was not clear whether they would maintain it and most importantly, whether 
they would ever adhere to basic international norms and standards as demanded by the UNSC. 
Accordingly, the UNSC had no other option than to impose sanctions on the Taliban only. 
Understanding the shift in what constitutes a targeted sanctions regime is fundamentally 
important. Al Qaeda was designed as a stateless entity and to this day this is considered as one 
of its biggest strengths. It is essentially a terrorist version of a franchise, with a large number 
of independent cells located all around the world operating under a common name. This 
statelessness precludes any country from waging conventional warfare against al Qaeda. 
Furthermore and contrary to general belief, it does not have a hierarchical structure or chain of 
command. The leader rather asserts a formal or, if preferred, spiritual function, and therefore 
if anything happened to him, the organization as a whole would not be paralyzed. This 
fragmentation makes al Qaeda an extremely dangerous group that is difficult to counter. The 
UNSC realized that the only way to fight these people was to target each individual and 
associate and bring them to justice. If, for whatever reason, this couldn’t be done, the sanctions 
regime would at least decrease their operability. 
                                                          
22 Ibid. 21.  
23 Ibid. 21. 
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However, it is worth noting that the name “al Qaeda” did not appear in the UNSC resolution 
until 2000.24 The international community was simply focusing so much on apprehension 
of Osama bin Laden that his organization was left free to develop. This mistake eventually 
allowed al Qaeda to plan and then execute the greatest terrorist attack of all time on September 
11, 2001. Who knows what the course of history would have been if Osama bin Laden had 
been removed from the scene back in the late 1990s? Nonetheless, in a clear sign of the 
Taliban’s support, he was given Afghan citizenship. In 1999, one year after the bombings of 
the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the UNSC faced a ground-breaking decision. For 
the reasons explained above, it could not impose sanctions on Afghanistan as a state, only 
against the entity that controlled it. The UNSC inter alia determined that the Taliban regime 
provided active support to terrorists, especially Osama bin Laden and his associates. Such 
activities clearly threatened international peace and security and therefore fulfilled the 
condition to enable the UNSC to take prompt and effective action in response to the situation.  
2.2. Sanctions regime pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1267 
2.2.1. Three elements of the regime 
As already mentioned, the Taliban failed to comply with any of the UNSC decisions. They did 
not take the final opportunity to surrender to the will of the international community, and 
therefore in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations the UNSC 
decided to impose sanctions on them.25 These sanctions initially comprised two elements. 
Firstly, any aircraft “owned, leased or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban,”26 would be 
prevented from taking off or landing in their territory, and secondly, any financial resources 
“owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban,”27 would be frozen. In 2000, these 
measures were strengthened by a third element preventing the Taliban from “direct or indirect 
supply, sale and transfer ... of arms and related material of all types including weapons and 
ammunition, military vehicles and equipment.”28 Although the sanctions regime was optimized 
and modified by many subsequent resolutions,29 the basic concept remained the same. 
                                                          
24 UN Doc. S/RES/1333(2000). 
25 UN Doc. S/RES/1267(1999), para. 3. 
26 UN Doc. S/RES/1267(1999), para. 4(a). 
27 UN Doc. S/RES/1267(1999), para. 4(b). 
28 UN Doc. S/RES/1333(2000), para. 5(a). 
29 UN Doc. S/RES/1390(2002); UN Doc. S/RES/1455(2003); UN Doc. 1526(2004); UN Doc. 1617(2005); UN 
Doc. 1735(2006); UN Doc. 1822(2008); UN Doc. 1904(2009); UN Doc. 1989(2011). 
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Along with the introduction of the sanctions regime, the UNSC established the Al Qaeda and 
Taliban Sanctions Committee (or 1267 Committee) to oversee implementation of the measures 
by States. It included all UNSC members and its tasks were listed in paragraph 6 of the same 
resolution.30 In general, the 1267 Committee is responsible for monitoring and reporting 
compliance with the provisions of the resolution and may make recommendations to the UNSC 
to improve the overall effectiveness of sanctions. Its importance increased over the years, 
especially with the creation of the so-called “Consolidated list.”   
2.2.2. Consolidated list in the pre-2009 era 
UNSC Resolution 1333 (2000) gave the 1267 Committee a mandate to maintain a list of 
individuals and entities that were somehow associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban. Currently, 
a separate list exists for each group,31 but originally only one list included both. Nevertheless, 
the purpose remained the same. Any person or organization whose name appeared on the list 
would be subject to sanctions in the form of assets freezing, travel bans and arms embargoes. 
At the time of its introduction, it was a quite rigorous system that depended almost exclusively 
on the decisions of the 1267 Committee. The more importance it gained, the more controversy 
it raised. Boulden pointedly notes that this contributed to putting the 1267 Committee’s 
“activity and the sanctions regime at the forefront of the increasing awareness of the impact of 
counter terrorist measures on questions of human rights.”32  
Inclusion in the list was carried out by the 1267 Committee. Member States put forward a list 
of candidates that were not necessarily convicted criminals, but had provable connections to al 
Qaeda or the Taliban. In 2002, the UNSC introduced exceptions into the sanctions regime that 
slightly decreased the strictness of assets freezing to allow the affected person to survive in 
society. In Resolution 1452 (2002), the UNSC decided that measures concerning assets 
freezing did not apply to “necessary basic expenses, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or 
mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility 
charges, or ... expenses associated with the provision of legal services.”33 Evidently, the UNSC 
                                                          
30 UN Doc. S/RES/1267(1999), para. 6.  
31 UN Doc. S/RES/1988(2011).  
32 Vaughan Lowe et al., The United Nations Security Council and war: the evolution of thought and practice 
since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 614. 
33 UN Doc. S/RES/1452(2002), para. 1(a). 
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by this action yielded to human rights advocates and proponents, who claimed that the 
effectiveness of the sanctions regime was detrimental to human rights and thus unacceptable. 
Removal from the list, or delisting, was at first practically impossible, as no legal mechanism 
enabled the 1267 Committee to remove a person or entity. The inevitable question must be 
asked, whether it was considered an issue of human rights at all in this regard. Over time, this 
mechanism was created so the affected person or entity (usually referred to as “the petitioner”) 
could be removed from the list if all fifteen members of the 1267 Committee consensually 
agreed to do so.34 It was vastly complicated and not an ideal solution, but things slowly began 
to change for the better.  
To be perfectly clear about how the system worked, consider the following imaginary scenario. 
Mr. XY is a hardworking and tax-paying citizen whose name mistakenly appears on the 
Consolidated list in 2001. From that moment on, he is subject to restrictions which essentially 
exclude him from all ordinary life. His confusion does not end when he finds out about the list. 
He does not know who put him there or for what reason, or which authority governs the issue. 
Anyone who provides him with assistance is also put on the list. Because Mr. XY is denied 
access to financial resources, it is extremely difficult for him to survive in society. What he 
probably also does not know is that seeking removal from the list is futile as no mechanism is 
in place to facilitate it. Either way, Mr. XY is desperate and probably will not stop until his 
name is removed from the list. The whole story could be compared to Don Quixote tilting at 
windmills, yet as we will learn in the following subsection, thanks to people like Mr. XY, the 
system was about to change significantly. 
2.2.3. The case of Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation 
Let us move from an imaginary to a real-life scenario that resulted in a major case in this field. 
When the UNSC adopted Resolution 1267 (1999), the Council of the European Union (EC) 
under the provisions of the United Nations Charter (Articles 1, 24, 25, 39, 41, 48, and 103, in 
particular) took necessary steps to implement the resolution. As the 1267 sanctions regime 
developed, the EC kept up by adopting a series of Common positions and Regulations. These 
basically transposed the UNSC resolutions. After the UNSC mandated the 1267 Committee 
                                                          
34 UN Doc. S/RES/1730(2006).  
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through Resolution 1333 (2000) to maintain and update a list of individuals and entities 
connected to the Taliban or al Qaeda, the EC implemented these new measures accordingly.  
Among the relevant EC regulations we can name Regulation 337/2000 “concerning a flight 
ban and a freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of 
Afghanistan;”35 Regulation 467/2001 “prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to 
Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial 
resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, and repealing Regulation 337/2000;”36 and 
most importantly, Regulation 881/2002 defining what is meant by “funds” and “freezing of 
funds”.37 
Regulation 881/2002 provided, inter alia, that “[a]ll funds and economic resources belonging 
to, or owned or held by, a natural or legal person, group or entity designated by the [1267] 
Sanctions Committee and listed in Annex I shall be frozen.”38 The amended Annex I included 
the names of Yassin Abdullah Kadi39 (natural person) and the Al Barakaat International 
Foundation40 (legal person). The appearance of the two names initiated one of the most 
important cases in this area of study.  
The proceedings in this case were lengthy and complicated, but its result was significant. 
In 2001, Mr. Kadi and the Al Barakaat International Foundation both instituted proceedings 
against the Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Communities 
seeking the annulment of several regulations, specifically 467/2001, 2062/2001, and 
2199/2001, “in so far as those measures concern them.”41 
The first appellant, Mr. Kadi, argued that (a) the right to be heard, (b) the right to respect for 
property and of the principle of proportionality, and (c) the right to effective judicial review 
were breached.42 The second appellant, the Al Barakaat International Foundation, claimed that 
(a) the Council of the European Union was not competent to adopt the contested regulation, (b) 
                                                          
35 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Judgement of the 
European Court of Justice, September 3, 2008, para. 18. 
36 Ibid., para. 25. 
37 Ibid., para. 38. 
38 Council of the European Union Regulation 881/2002, Article 2(1). 
39 European Commission Regulation 2062/2001. 
40 European Commission Regulation 2199/2001. 
41 Ibid. 35, para. 46. 
42 Ibid. 35, para. 49. 
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Article 249 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (or EC treaty) was infringed, 
and (c) its fundamental rights were breached.43 
These were very cogent and reasonable arguments. However, the Court of First Instance of 
European Communities (CFI) dismissed the actions in two judgements claiming that it has no 
jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of decisions of the Security Council. In this regard the CFI 
stated that the “resolutions of the Security Council at issue fall, in principle, outside the ambit 
of the Court’s judicial review and the Court has no authority to call in question, even indirectly, 
their lawfulness in the light of Community law.”44 On the contrary, the CFI continued, “the 
Court is bound, so far as possible, to interpret and apply that law in a manner compatible with 
the obligations of the Member States under the Charter of the United Nations.”45 Considering 
the legal obligations of the Member States towards the UN Charter, this was a logical 
explanation.  
The CFI also examined whether the UN had breached jus cogens. It referred to Article 53 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) in which jus cogens is defined 
“a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by 
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character.” Article 64 of the same convention further provides, that “[i]f a new 
peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict 
with that norm becomes void and terminates.” In this regard, the CFI simply followed the 
thought of international relations recognizing some sort of structure or hierarchy. Obviously, 
such hierarchy does not really exist. On the other hand, the United Nations undoubtedly asserts 
a central role in an anarchic international system. The CFI confirmed that the European 
Community is primarily bound by the Charter of the United Nations, which in Article 1(1) 
provides that while delivering to one of its main purposes, maintaining international peace and 
security, the UN must act “in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.” 
In addition, the UN reaffirms the respect for fundamental human rights already in the preamble 
of the Charter. It is therefore expected that any decision made within the framework of the 
                                                          
43 Ibid. 35, para. 50.  
44 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Case 
T-315/01, Judgement of the Court of First Instance, September 21, 2005, para. 225; Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al 
Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities, Case T-306/01, Judgement of the Court of First Instance, September 21, 2005, para. 276. 
45 Ibid. 
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United Nations, including resolutions of the UNSC adopted under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, will be properly negotiated and adopted in accordance with these principles.  
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) was not of the same opinion as the CFI. In 2008, the ECJ 
overruled the CFI judgements stating that the “Community judicature must, in accordance with 
the powers conferred on it by the EC Treaty, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of 
the lawfulness of all Community acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral 
part of the general principles of Community law, including review of Community measures 
which, like the contested regulation, are designed to give effect to the resolutions adopted by 
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”46 The 2008 
judgement held that neither the ECJ nor the CFI is empowered to review the lawfulness of 
UNSC resolutions, “even if that review were to be limited to the examination of the 
compatibility of that resolution with jus cogens.”47 Furthermore, the ECJ stated that the 
freezing of assets constituted a breach of fundamental rights.48 Accordingly, in its ruling the 
ECJ set aside the judgements of the CFI of 2005 concerning Mr. Kadi and the Al Barakaat 
International Foundation. The ECJ also annulled EC Regulation 881/2002 in so far as it 
concerned the two appellants. 
It was an interesting development in the case. Posch notes that the ECJ “did not challenge 
the existing hierarchy of norms within the international legal order”, but at the same time, he 
continues “by emphasizing the rule of law the Court stated that the judicial review also covers 
all Community acts, even if they are designed merely to give effect to resolutions adopted by 
the UN Security Council.”49 There is an evident uncertainty in this respect, however, careful 
wording of the ECJ judgement covered the area quite well.  
Even though the hierarchy of the international legal system remained unchallenged, this case 
contributed to triggering the changes made to sanctions regimes, especially concerning the 
Consolidated list. This issue is examined in the following subsection.  
                                                          
46 Ibid. 35, para. 326.  
47 Ibid. 35, para. 287.  
48 Ibid. 35. Para. 370. 
49 Albert Posch, “The Kadi Case: Rethinking the relationship between EU law and international law,” Columbia 
Journal of European Law 15 (2009): 4. 
 
Page 16 of 34 
 
2.2.4. Consolidated list in the post-2009 era 
After more than a decade and in reaction to the persisting controversy concerning 
the Consolidated list, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1904 (2009) creating the Office 
of the Ombudsperson (its mandate was extended by Resolution 1989 (2011)). It is an entirely 
independent and impartial body which reviews and investigates requests for removal from 
the list on case by case basis. It is important to mention that it deals only with requests 
concerning the al Qaeda sanctions list.  
The establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson brought a major improvement to 
the delisting procedure. The whole process, which should not take more than six months, 
consists of two steps described in Annex II of Resolution 1989 (2011). In the first step, 
the Ombudsperson gathers and verifies all relevant information about “the petitioner” and 
further engages in dialogue to obtain more data. In the second step, the Ombudsperson presents 
a Comprehensive Report to the 1267 Committee with the findings of the investigation 
conducted in the previous step and a recommendation whether to remove the petitioner from 
the list. The 1267 Committee reviews the Comprehensive Report within 15 days and in another 
15 days considers the recommendation. In the 60 days after consideration, the 1267 Committee 
may reject the delisting request by consensual vote. 
Compared to the pre-2009 era, the new system not only simplifies the procedure of delisting, 
but also promotes respect for fundamental human rights. With the introduction of the Office of 
the Ombudsperson, the UNSC reversed the process of delisting. Initially, the petitioner had to 
convince the 15 members of the 1267 Committee to remove their name from the Consolidated 
List. As of 2009, the petitioner has only to convince the Ombudsperson. The recommendation 
has a special status since it does not require the approval of the 1267 Committee, but if some 
of its members disagree that the petitioner should be removed from the list, the 1267 Committee 
must agree consensually on it.  
To be clear how the new system works, consider again the imaginary scenario of Mr. XY, 
whose name was mistakenly put on the list. Undoubtedly, he would have a much better chance 
of having his name removed from the Consolidated list. Following proper investigation, the 
Office of the Ombudsperson would recommend the 1267 Committee that Mr. X’s name be 
removed from the list. If the 1267 Committee did not within the next 15 days decide otherwise, 
the Ombudsperson’s recommendation would prevail and Mr. XY would be removed from the 
list.  
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2.3. Sanctions regime pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1373 
In December 1999, the UNGA adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (or Terrorism Financing Convention).50 It is important to realize that 
until the late 1990s and early 2000s no measures existed for countering this vulnerable area of 
terrorism. For instance, if we went through all the international legal instruments to counter 
terrorism, we would not find any references to measures against the financing of terrorism. 
However surprising this might seem, it is a fact. 
The Terrorism Financing Convention built on the assumption that terrorists need money 
to terrorize. A terrorist group, similarly to any other organization, whether legal or illegal, 
needs financial resources in order to function. Therefore, deprivation of assets would not only 
cause them difficulties to operate, but ideally it would avert the threat of an attack.  
The issue of terrorist financing can be divided into two parts. Firstly, they have to acquire and 
cumulate resources. This usually involves, but is not restricted to, organized crime. Remember 
that Osama bin Laden’s various companies, as well as MAK, were legal businesses before they 
were outlawed. The main difference between terrorists and organized criminals is that the 
money they make serves a different purpose. Unlike organized criminals, whose aim is to make 
profit from money purposed to further increase profit, terrorists use the resources to fund other 
activities with the intention of achieving their (political) goals. Secondly, terrorists need to be 
able to move the resources quickly and discretely around the world. The key issue in this 
respect is above all assessing the risk of detection. Over the years, they discovered several gaps 
in the international legal and financial system and did not hesitate to take advantage of them. 
Among the techniques are wire transfers, alternative remittance systems (especially 
“hawala”),51 charities and non-profit organizations, and cash couriers. All these methods have 
their advantages and disadvantages, whether viewed from the terrorist’s or the counter-
terrorist’s angle.  
According to the Terrorism Financing Convention, “[e]ach State Party shall take appropriate 
measures, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, for the identification, detection and 
freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing the offences 
                                                          
50 UN Doc. A/RES/54/109(1999). 
51 The US Department of the Treasury describes “hawala” as an “alternative or parallel remittance system, 
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set forth in Article 2,” which provides that “[a]ny person commits an offence within the 
meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and 
wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out” terrorist activity. 
This activity is defined as “[a]ny act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or 
to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
act.” These provisions govern early definition of terrorism and provide a basis for the 
international fight against the financing of terrorism.  
Despite these efforts, humanity experienced a tragedy of colossal proportions at the turn of the 
century. On September 11, 2001, nineteen hijackers took control of four aircraft with the aim 
of crashing them into selected targets on US soil. Two planes crashed into the Twin Towers of 
the World Trade Centre in New York, one plane hit the Pentagon building in Arlington, and 
the last plane, although it was supposed to hit the US Capitol building, crashed into the 
Pennsylvanian woods instead. The 9/11 attacks resulted in almost 3000 deaths and enormous 
material damage.52  
Society and grieving families of victims demanded who could be responsible for such 
a malicious attack. Investigations pointed to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. Everyone was 
shocked that a group of people about whom they had barely heard anything previously was 
able to plan and execute an attack of such magnitude. For that matter, they were also confused 
as to why the United States and the West were hated so much. Despite the mixed feelings, all 
people shared the desire to bring the responsible terrorists to justice.  
With the assumption that al Qaeda leadership and Osama bin Laden were hiding in 
Afghanistan, the United States demanded the Taliban to surrender them without delay.53 
This request was ignored and the United States invoked its rights under Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty of 1949, which can be simply explained as “an attack on one is an attack on 
                                                          
52 “Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents,” RAND Corporation, accessed July 30, 2012 
http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search.php. 
53 George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation” (address before a Joint Session of the Congress of the United States 
– Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, Washington DC, September 20, 2001). 
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all” and launched military intervention in Afghanistan commonly known as Operation 
Enduring Freedom.        
The tragic events of 9/11 triggered the global “war on terrorism.”54 The then US President 
George W. Bush stressed that this war “will not end until every terrorist group of global reach 
has been found, stopped and defeated.”55 Although it might sound promising, it was obvious 
from the very beginning that such war would be long and complicated. The international 
community, while aware of the imminent dangers, was toothless against terrorists other than al 
Qaeda or the Taliban. From the point of view of various terrorist groups, the 9/11 attacks could 
be seen as a great achievement. Al Qaeda’s glory attracted many sympathizers. Those who did 
not sympathize with their goals saw however an opportunity to learn. There is no doubt that 
the 9/11 attacks were utterly unprecedented. The world realized that previous efforts had not 
been effective enough. Terrorism seemed to be suddenly spreading like a plague. It was a time 
of emergency, and as it is said, desperate times call for desperate measures. In view of this 
saying, the UNSC decided to temporarily assert a role as international legislator. 
According to general practice, when an area of international law exists that is not covered, 
the international community initiates negotiations. The outcome of these negotiations is usually 
a treaty. In 2001, this was a less likely option seeing that these discussions usually take 
considerable time, and that even after the creation of such treaty, the process is further 
prolonged by necessary formalities (see Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties of 1969). Nevertheless, no new treaty needed to be created because the Terrorism 
Financing Convention already existed. The only problem with the Terrorism Financing 
Convention was that it had not yet been ratified and implemented by all its signatory states. 
Having considered all the options, the UNSC proceeded with adopting Resolution 1373 (2001). 
In addition to the decision on new counter terrorism measures (mostly derived from Resolution 
1267), the UNSC called upon all States to “[b]ecome parties as soon as possible to the relevant 
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999.”56 From 
that moment on, the aforementioned global “war on terrorism” started becoming reality. 
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Despite the unprecedented strength the resolution embodied, note how carefully worded it is. 
For instance, rather than ordering all States to implement the Terrorism Financing Convention, 
the UNSC encouraged them to do so. Although the UNSC bears the burden of responding to 
any threat to peace or security with the power at its disposal, it cannot take the risk to exceed 
its competence. Of course, it is desirable that the UNSC is efficient, but it must not act to the 
exclusion of its legitimacy. 
UNSC Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001) “differ in the persons and entities whose 
funds or other assets are to be frozen, the authorities responsible for making these designations, 
and the effect of these designations.”57 Boulden argues that the UNSC began to “shift from a 
case-specific approach ... to one that is more broadly based.”58 While the 1999 resolution 
targeted selected individuals and entities, the 2001 resolution targeted terrorism generally. This 
is another ground-breaking innovation on the part of the UNSC. Even though the two 
resolutions represent different regimes, their purpose is the same.  
Just as with Resolution 1267 (1999), the UNSC established a committee under Resolution 1373 
tasked with overseeing its implementation by Member States. It is called the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee (CTC) and as of 2004 was complemented59 by the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
Executive Directorate (CTED), a group of experts from outside its framework. The CTC, or 
CTED for that matter, is by no means as powerful as the 1267 Committee. Boulden noted that 
“[w]hile the CTC and CTED represent a new role for the Security Council, it remains the case 
that the CTC and other anti-terrorism measures do not as yet contain any kind of enforcement 
mechanism or threat of enforcement.”60 Neither the CTC nor CTED have the mandate to 
maintain a list of individuals and entities as with the 1267 Committee. If the UNSC decided to 
do so, it would be an enormous enterprise facing similar, if not the same, problems as the 1267 
Committee. Instead, the UNSC promotes and enhances the cooperation of Member States in 
the field of global countering of the financing of terrorism.  
To sum up the evolution of the sanctions – as non-forcible measures to enforce law, they have 
developed into a strong instrument of the international community. The success in the “war on 
                                                          
57 “FATF IX Special Recommendations,” Financial Action Task Force, page 8, accessed August 3, 2012, 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Standards%20-
%20IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf. 
58 Vaughan Lowe et al., The United Nations Security Council and war: the evolution of thought and practice 
since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 611. 
59 UN Doc. S/RES/1535(2004). 
60 Ibid. 58, at 620. 
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terrorism” depends on the coordinated approach offered primarily by the United Nations. White 
and Abass argue that States, while taking punitive or coercive measures, “should seek the 
authority of a regional organization and preferably, though not necessarily, the United 
Nations.”61 Over decades, the United Nations has gradually asserted a role as a major, or 
central, international organization. Boyle and Chinkin identify various reasons why this is so, 
arguing that it is due to the UN being seen as a legitimate body.62 It has earned this status 
through universal membership as well as universal competence. Essentially, the UN constitutes 
a type of global forum open to any State where any issue or topic may be addressed. These 
characteristics enable the United Nations, and therefore the international community, to defend 
itself against a perfidious phenomenon such as terrorism. However, as we will find out in the 
following chapter, insufficient action from Member States causes the sanctions regime(s) to 
not fully explore their potential and consequently not be fully effective.  
3. ASSESSMENT 
3.1. Analytical Sanctions and the Monitoring Team 
One does not need to go far to find a source of information on the performance of the sanctions 
regime. In 2004, the UNSC decided to create the Analytical Support and Monitoring Team 
(Monitoring Team) with the objective “to assist the (1267) Committee in the fulfilment of its 
mandate.”63 Despite the fact that it was initially established for a period of 18 months, the 
mandate of the Monitoring Team was progressively extended. One of its main responsibilities 
is to periodically report on the implementation of measures and make recommendations for 
improved implementation. The latest report providing an overall assessment of each of the 
three sanctions regime elements was published on April 13, 2011.64 
Concerning the first element, assets freezing, the Monitoring Team informed that al Qaeda and 
the Taliban “continue to raise money through legal means, such as donations and legitimate 
business enterprises, and illegally, such as through kidnapping for ransom, extortion, drug 
trafficking and illegal taxation.”65 As these methods have been in use for some time, it is an 
acknowledgement of the danger that arises from them. More importantly, the Monitoring Team 
                                                          
61 Ibid 13, at 555. 
62 Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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63 UN Doc. S/RES/1524(2004), para. 6.  
64 UN Doc. S/2011/245. 
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focused in the latter text on different techniques of moving money around the world. In this 
regard, it recognized the risks posed by the hawala alternative remittance system, and so they 
recommended regulating it following the example of Saudi Arabia.66 In relation to non-profit 
organizations, the Monitoring Team stated that they “manage large budgets and move sums of 
money across jurisdictions legally and with great ease; thus they can provide a relatively safe 
global platform from which to move funds with minimum risk of detection.”67 For these 
reasons, the Monitoring Team encouraged all Member States to intensively monitor the activity 
of these organizations.68 Finally, the Monitoring Team addressed the problem of cash couriers. 
It advised that illegal movements of cash by cross-border couriers pose a problem that needs 
to be tackled in more sophisticated ways.69 The Monitoring Team often referred to the Financial 
Action Task Force nine special recommendations. These are examined in the following 
subsection.  
Concerning the second element of travel bans, the Monitoring Team stated that “[t]here will 
always be parts of the world where border controls are difficult to impose and all sorts of illegal 
groups, not just terrorists, will continue to take advantage of the situation.”70 The porous border 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan is probably the most relevant example of this struggle. The 
report, however, emphasized the achievements of Member States in this area. Not only is an 
increase of cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) 
evident, but identification and travel documents have improved, biometric passports have been 
introduced, and visa requirements have been tightened.71 Constant diligence, though, is 
required.  
According to the latest report, the international community achieved partial success in the arms 
embargo as the last element of the regime.72 It explicitly provides that the “continuation of the 
Taliban activity in Afghanistan suggests insufficient implementation of the arms embargo.”73 
In addition, the Monitoring Team warns against Somalia. Local Transitional Federal 
Government depends entirely on foreign aid which is barely sufficient to maintain order in 
Mogadishu. This lawless environment represents a fertile ground for groups like al Qaeda. 
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However, the position of al Qaeda is, thanks to the arms embargo, weaker than it used to be 
and contrary to the Taliban, lacks “the necessary logistical, recruitment and training networks 
to mount a sustained challenge to State authority.”74 At the same time, the Monitoring Team 
admits that this particular element would be more effective if Member States participated more 
in cooperation in this matter.  
Although the reports of the Analytical Sanctions and Monitoring Team represent an important 
piece of relevant material, its informative value would be greater if some of its parts were not 
as general as they are now. In other words, clarity is at the expense of quality. The Monitoring 
Team should realize that their readership comprises scholars and experts in the field, and 
therefore their reports should conform to this fact. In this respect, in evaluating the 
effectiveness of the sanctions regime, this source must not be solely relied on.  
3.2. Financial Action Task Force 
Another source of valuable information is an international organization called the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF). It is a “global standard setting body” established in 1989 aiming 
to “promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for 
combating money laundering, terrorist financing.”75 More precisely, the FATF “monitors 
the progress of its members in implementing necessary measures, reviews money laundering 
and terrorist financing techniques and counter-measures, and promotes the adoption and 
implementation of appropriate measures globally.”76  
The UNSC recognizes the importance of the FATF. In Resolution 1617 (2005) it “strongly 
urges all Member States to implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in 
the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and 
the FATF Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.”77 In 2011, the UNSC 
further encouraged Member States to “utilize the guidance provided by Special 
Recommendation III for effective implementation of targeted counter-terrorism sanctions.”78 
These UNSC resolutions suggest that the FATF enjoy a special status in this particular field. 
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In other words, States should adhere to the decisions of the UNSC, and in case they require 
additional guidance, are encouraged to follow the FATF standards.  
In the sense of its aim, the FATF set down forty recommendations, which were complemented 
by nine special recommendations following the tragic events of September 11, 2001. In 
February 2012, all forty and the nine special recommendations were revised. The IX Special 
recommendations, standards that are the subject of our focus, are as follows:79  
I. Ratification and implementation of UN instruments 
II. Criminalising the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering 
III. Freezing and confiscating terrorist asset 
IV. Reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism 
V. International co-operation 
VI. Alternative remittance 
VII. Wire transfers 
VIII. Non-profit organizations 
IX. Cash couriers 
It is plain that the FATF nine special recommendations represent the general concept of 
countering the financing of terrorism. For the purposes of this dissertation, two special 
recommendations will be focused on – SR I and SR III. . Strategically placed first, SR I is self-
explanatory. In this recommendation the FATF encourages states to implement the 1999 
Terrorist Financing Convention and subsequently UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) – 
international legal instruments with global impact.80 In essence, SR III complements SR I and 
consists of two main objectives that draw on Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001). 
The interpretative note of SR III explains that “[t]he intent of the first objective is preventative, 
while the intent of the second objective is mainly preventative and punitive.”81  
The FATF, however, does not only set a series of standards that should be followed. It also 
periodically monitors and evaluates the performance of Member States in terms of compliance 
with its recommendations. Each year it publishes a comprehensive report that usually includes 
a detailed assessment of the performance of each FATF member country. These reports 
represent a great source of information that can be utilized in our research.  
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To make things easier, the latest 2010–2011 report includes a comprehensive table (see 
Appendix 1) comparing the level of implementation of all nine special recommendations in 
each FATF member country.82 It is necessary to highlight though that the FATF recognizes 
four different levels of compliance with the recommendations. In this regard, compliant (C) 
means excellent performance (the recommendation is fully observed with respect to all 
essential criteria)83, largely compliant (LC) means very good performance (only minor 
shortcomings exist, with a large majority of the essential criteria being fully met),84 partially 
compliant (PC) means good performance (the country has taken some substantive action and 
complies with some of the essential criteria),85 and lastly, non-compliant (NC), which means 
poor performance (major shortcomings exist, with a large majority of the essential criteria not 
being met).86  
In effort to assess current data more precisely, I have used single digit numbers instead of 
acronyms to determine the level of compliance. Accordingly, C = 1; LC = 2; PC = 3; and 
NC = 4. The converted table (see Appendix 2) allows us to do basic mathematical calculations.  
Simple averages uncover more precise statistics, lower numbers representing better 
performance. The average of the 34 FATF Member States across the nine special 
recommendations is 2.6. The average of the SR I and SR III combined is 2.5, which is a little 
better, however, rounded up it still falls at the level of partial compliance. The overall score is 
therefore not very positive. Each country considered separately, the best compliance with the 
nine special recommendations was achieved by the United Kingdom (1.6). Argentina, on 
the other hand, demonstrated the worst (3.4). If we narrow down the selection to SR I and SR 
III only, the United Kingdom emerges once again as the best-complying country (1.0). 
The worst performance was achieved by Brazil (4.0). 
Simple mathematics confirmed that the statistics do not show positive data. Partial compliance 
should not be a standard that FATF Member States try to achieve. It is alarming that so many 
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years after introduction of the nine special recommendations only one country, the United 
Kingdom, has been able to fully comply with both SR I and SR III. Even worse is that during 
the same period, Brazil was not able to adhere to any of these standards. 
3.3. Council of Europe – MONEYVAL 
In 1998, the Council of Europe (CoE) created the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of 
Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (or MONEYVAL). It 
comprises the CoE countries which are not members of the FATF (except for the Russian 
Federation, which is a member of both). The MONEYVAL periodically organizes so-called 
mutual evaluations. The outcome of these evaluations is usually published in mutual evaluation 
reports. During each country visit, MONEYVAL experts assess performance in accordance 
with the FATF standards.  
Contrary to the FATF, MONEYVAL does not publish comprehensive annual reports. Even so, 
if we go through all thirty mutual evaluation reports, we can extract the most relevant data and 
put it in a table (see Appendix 3).87 Similarly to the FATF table, single digit numbers are used 
instead of original abbreviations to determine the level of compliance and to increase the 
accuracy of evaluation (see Appendix 4).  
Accordingly, the overall average of all special recommendations in all countries can be 
calculated as 2.8, therefore 0.2 worse than in the case of the FATF. The average of the selected 
SR I and SR III is 3.0, which is 0.3 worse than the FATF. Again, the initial statistics do not 
show very positive numbers. Both averages clearly fall within the partially compliant threshold, 
which should not be an acceptable standard.  
When assessing each country separately, the table provided the following numbers. In the nine 
special recommendations average, Slovenia demonstrated the best performance (1.9) and 
Croatia showed the worst (3.4). The averages of SR I and SR III showed Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic together as the best (2.0), and Andorra as the worst (4.0). 
We can conclude from these numbers that the system, no matter how well designed it may be, 
is not fully effective. Hence, we are precluded from exploring its full efficiency due to 
persisting problems with (non-)compliance. As long as the majority of states do not fully 
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comply with the relevant legal standards, the system will not function properly. The distinct 
link between effectiveness and compliance is mentioned by the FATF President in his briefing 
to the Counter-Terrorism Committee.88 The United Nations may produce an infinite number of 
binding and non-binding standards and norms; however, these efforts are futile until Member 
States adhere to them. The mere existence of organizations and groups of experts such as the 
FATF and MONEYVAL indicate the existence of weaknesses. Nevertheless, it is important to 
understand that the problem does not lie in the system as such, but in the willingness of the 
States that compose it. The figures above only prove the correctness of this argument.  
CONCLUSION 
We have examined the history and current practice of targeted and global sanctions against 
terrorism. On this journey, the targets have grown in number, from Osama bin Laden, to his 
allies in the Taliban, and finally to his own organization of al Qaeda. In May 2011, the most 
wanted terrorist of all time, Osama bin Laden, was tracked down and killed at his private 
compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Al Qaeda may have been momentarily crippled but was 
by no means destroyed. The same applies to the Taliban, whose leader Mohammed Omar still 
escapes justice. The existence of these two groups can be compared to a smouldering coal. 
To put it out once and for all the international community will have to act, comply with the 
relevant international legal instruments, improve cooperation, and increase the effectiveness of 
the sanctions regime. 
As we have learnt, the major weakness of this regime is lack of compliance with the measures 
set out in the UNSC resolutions and other relevant international legal instruments. This must 
change, and possibly in a rapid manner. Terrorists, especially al Qaeda members, are known 
for their ability to adapt to a new environment. The gaps in compliance only offer another 
opportunity for terrorists to be one step ahead. The Financial Action Task Force therefore, apart 
from publishing compliance reports, also warns about countries whose performance in terms 
of countering the financing of terrorism is exceptionally bad. Among the high-risk and non-
cooperative jurisdictions, as they call these countries, the FATF name Iran and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In its Public Statement89 of June 22, 2012, the FATF 
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expressed its deep concern about Iran’s and the DPRK’s “failure to address the significant 
deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism regime 
and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system.”90 In this 
regard, the FATF urged both Iran and the DPRK to address these deficiencies without further 
delay.91  
In his address to the Council of Europe, the FATF President stated that “some jurisdictions 
expose us all to unacceptable risk by failing to implement effective AML/CFT systems. When 
a country chooses not to engage in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing 
in a meaningful way, we must all be ready to take firm action.”92 Of course, the FATF is not 
empowered to force any State, even its members, to follow its guidelines. This is, though, in 
the competence of the UNSC. Insisting on adherence to the decisions of the UNSC is essential 
not only to increase overall effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts, but also to maintain 
legitimacy of the United Nations as a whole.  
I would like to conclude by quoting former US President Ronald W. Reagan, who said that 
“[i]t is up to us, in our time, to choose and choose wisely between the hard but necessary task 
of preserving peace and freedom and the temptation to ignore our duty and blindly hope for the 
best while the enemies of freedom grow stronger day by day.”93 Although these words 
addressed a slightly different topic in different times, it aptly fits the problem of countering 
terrorism. There is no doubt that the international community will face many obstacles on 
the way to a terror-free world. The difficulties must not, however, prevent it from continuing 
in the effort to maintain international peace and security.  
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